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Article 5

The Need to Change Traditional Entitlement-Doctrine Analysis
in Decertification of Nursing Homes
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1965 Congress enacted Medicare' and Medicaid 2 to meet the health
care needs of the nation's elderly, poor and disabled. Medicare is administered federally through the Social Security Administration, 3 and is financed by
federal payroll taxes. 4 Medicaid is a joint federal and state effort. The federal
government sets guidelines and requirements that the states must follow in
their administration of the program. 5 Medicaid is financed by both federal
and state dollars. 6 Although the administration and financing of the Medicare
and Medicaid programs differ, their structure is basically the same. Each employs a vendor payment system. The program beneficiary receives service
from a health care provider who is certified to participate in Medicare, Medicaid, or both. Certification is attained when the provider shows compliance
with all applicable statutory and regulatory provisions. The provider renders
the services and is retrospectively or prospectively reimbursed by the government. 7 The programs, then, involve three parties: the individual beneficiary,
the provider, and the government.
The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid has had a great impact on the
health care industry in the United States.8 That impact is probably most visible in the nursing home industry where growth since 1965 has been remarkable9 and dependence on federal and state monies is substantial. 10 Medicare's
long term care coverage is limited. It will cover services in a skilled nursing
facility for up to one hundred days per spell of illness, but only for persons
hospitalized for at least three days.' Medicare financed two percent of all
nursing home expenditures in 1979.12 Medicaid has much broader coverage
of long term care services. It requires that all states fihance care in skilled
nursing facilities, and makes financing of care in intermediate care facilities
1. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 290 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395-139511 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979)).
2. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 290 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396d (1976 & Supp. 111 1979)).

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk (1976).
4. Id. § 1395i(a).
5. Id. § 1396a.
6. Id § 1396b (Supp. III 1979), as amended by Act of Oct. 7, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-398,
§ 901, 94 Stat. 1564.
7. 42 U.S.C. 1395g (1976).
8. See generally R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID (1974); E. WrrKiN, THE IMPACT OF MEDICARE (1971).
9. See notes 24-35 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 146-47 and accompanying text infra.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d(a)(2), 1395x(a) (1976).
12. Gibson, NationalHealth Expenditures, 1979, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW 1, 7
(Summer, 1980) [hereinafter Gibson, 1979 Expenditures].
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optional.' 3 Medicaid financed a remarkable forty-nine percent of all nursing
home expenditures in 1979.14 Given the large role of Medicare and Medicaid
in the financing of long term care, it is clear that a nursing home's certification
under the programs is a very valuable asset.
When the Department of Health and Human Services or state Medicaid
agencies move to decertify nursing homes' 5 they are sometimes met with facility challenges to the procedures used for decertification.16 Courts faced with
such challenges have consistently applied the entitlement doctrine to determine the proper amount of protection owed the nursing home in the decertification process. 17 That doctrine examines the relationship between the nursing
home and the government to determine whether the facility has an interest in
the Medicare or Medicaid programs that is protected by the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.' 8 If such an interest is found, the court then determines the procedures adequate to protect it.19
Several unique features of the Medicare and Medicaid programs distinguish them from other government programs to which the entitlement doctrine
has been applied. 20 If these features are not recognized by the courts, the entitlement analysis may not adequately meet the realities of a Medicare or Medicaid decertification. This question, along with past judicial treatment of
Medicare and Medicaid provider entitlement claims, will be examined in this
Comment.
II.

A.

STRUCTURE OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PROVIDER PARTICIPATION

The NursingHome Industry

The nursing home has changed markedly in character in the past twenty
years. It has become an industry. Once a relatively small-scale enterprise typified by small, independent operations, it is now dominated by investor-owned
proprietary chains. 2 ' A 1977 survey found that only twenty-six percent of
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(4)(A) & (15) (1976); see notes 45-50 and accompanying text infra.
14. Gibson, supra note 12, at 7.
15. See notes 60-77 and accompanying text infra.

16. See notes 124-125 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 124-170 and accompanying text infra.
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

19. See notes 81-123 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 176-207 and accompanying text infra.
21. Wing & Craige, Health
Care Regulation"Dilemma ofa PariallyDevelopedPublicPolicy,
(1979).
57 N.C.L. REv. 1165, 1181
Nursing Home Industry Review, a prospectus issued by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. (October 31, 1979), at 1,made the following comment:
Although essentially unnoticed by investors and acquisition-oriented health care companies, the nursing home field appears to possess most of the desirable characteristics that
both groups seek in making investments. In the following analysis, we attempt to show
that: (1) the nursin$ home industry should continue to be one of the fastest growing, if
not the fastest growing, major segments of the U.S. health care industry; (2) the shortage
of beds, combined with improvements in the reimbursement system, should assure
above-average profitability; and (3) growing economics of scale in nursing homes should
provide increasing opportunities for efficient, multifacility operators (such as Beverly
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nursing homes were non-profit or public institutions. 22 This percentage is
likely to decrease in the future as the trend in construction and acquisition of
proprietary facilities continues to overtake
the unchanging number of non23

profit and public nursing home beds.

The increasing percentage of investor-owned proprietary facilities as a

proportion of the total number of nursing homes reflects rapid growth within
the industry. There are approximately eighteen thousand nursing homes in

the United States today,2 4 serving a total nursing home population of 2.2 mil-

lion.25 This reveals a 250 percent increase in the number of nursing home

residents between 1963 and 1977.26
Many who have examined the nursing home industry, and health care
facilities generally, contend that this remarkable growth has been due largely
to the availability of Medicare and Medicaid funds.27 In 1977, only 12.4 percent of the nursing home beds in the United States were not certified for either

Medicare or Medicaid. 28 Sixty percent of nursing home residents nationally,
29
are supported partially or totally by Medicaid, and two percent by Medicare.
Thus, of the 2.2 million people
in nursing homes today, 1.3 million receive
30
Medicare or Medicaid funds.

Recent figures on government expenditures for nursing home care reveal
further the large role of both the federal and state government in the financing

of long term care.21 Although only two percent of all nursing home expenditures were covered by Medicare in

1979,32

Medicaid financed forty-nine per-

cent of nursing home care in that year. 33 Translated into dollar amounts, state
Ent. and National Medical Ent.) to grow rapidly by means of acquisition in this highly
fragmented industry.
22. Wing & Craige, supra note 21, at 1183.
23. Nursing Home Industry Review, supra note 21, at 3.
24. This figure includes nursing homes, personal care homes and domidilaries. U.S. DEPT.
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HEALTH: UNITED STATES 97 (1978).
25. Richmond Times Dispatch, July 10, 1980.
26. Wing & Craige, supra note 21, at 1182. The size of the facilities themselves, though, has
not changed markedly over the last twenty years. The large majority of nursing homes today
remain relatively small, with less than one hundred beds. Id. at 1183.

27. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE BOOK 91 (1976):
Annual net income of non-profit and for-profit hospitals increased from $29 million in
1950 to $547 million in 1971 ....
Medicare and Medicaid apparently contributed significantly to these improvements.
28. Wing & Craige, supra note 21, at 1183.
29. Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care andLfe in Nursing Homes: The Dilemma ofEnforcement, 57 N.C.L. REv. 1317, 1318 n.9 (1979).
30. Richmond Times Dispatch, supra note 25.
31. For example, in 1975 total expenditures for nursing home care were $9,000,300,000. Of
this amount $257 million was financed by Medicare and $2,562,900,000 was financed by Medicaid. HOUSE COMM., supra note 27, at 109. Total expenditures, both private and public, for long
term care have been increasing steadily over the years: $1.3 billion in 1965; $12.6 billion in 1977,
Wing and Craige, supra note 21, at 1182; $15.8 billion in 1978, Gibson, NationalHealthExpenditures, 1978, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW, 1, 4 (Summer, 1979) [hereinafter Gibson, 1978
Expenditures]; and $17.8 billion in 1979, Gibson, 1979 Expenditures, supra note 12, at 5.
32. Gibson, 1979 Expenditures, supra, note 12, at 7.
33. Id.
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and federal expenditures for long term care under Medicare and Medicaid
amounted to 7.2 billion dollars in 1978, 34 and 9.1 billion dollars in 1979. 3 This extensive public funding of nursing home care for the needy elderly
has caused great concern over conditions in long term care facilities. Medicare
and Medicaid reimbursement can constitute the bulk of the payments going to
a nursing home. A facility could potentially provide inadequate medical and
nursing services with these federal and state dollars. The desire to prevent
improper use of government monies, and to insure that adequate care is provided to all publicly-supported nursing home residents has resulted in a constant effort by both state and federal governments to police the qualifications
of facilities receiving government dollars.
B. Terms and Conditions of Nursing Home Certification
Nursing homes must be certified by the state Medicaid agency in order to
participate in the Medicaid program. The task of determining
Medicare certi36
fication is generally handled by the states as well.
Each facility must satisfy several major requirements to gain its certification. It must first comply with the Conditions of Participation. 37 These conditions, which cover both Medicare and Medicaid participation, require
compliance with all federal, state and local laws and regulations, including
those regarding state licensure.3 8 They establish standards relating to facility2
4
4
administration, 39 patients' rights, 40 staffing requirements, ' facility services,
physical plant,4 3 and utilization review. 44
In addition, each facility must meet the requirements set out in the statutes defining skilled nursing and intermediate care facilities. Nursing homes
have been classified by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
according to the level of care they offer. Those that provide twenty-four hour
nursing services are termed skilled nursing facilities.4 5 Medicare will cover
services in a skilled nursing facility for up to one hundred days per spell of
illness. 46 Medicaid provides complete coverage for care in skilled nursing facilities.47
The alternative form of services are those provided by intermediate care
facilities. They provide less intensive nursing care than skilled nursing facili34. Gibson, 1978 Expenditures, supra note 31, at 12.
35. Gibson, 1979 Expenditures, supra note 12, at 7.

36.
37.
38.
39.

42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a) (1976).
42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1101-.1137 (1980).
Id. § 405.1120.
Id. §405.1121.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. §§ 405.1122-.1124.
Id. §§ 405.1125-.1132.
Id. §§ 405.1134-.1136.

44. Id. §405.1137.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(j) (1976).
46. Id. § 1395d(a)(2).
47. Id. § 1396d(a)(14)-(15).
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ties, and therefore presumably serve a more functional and less ill resident
population. 48 Medicare does not finance intermediate care at all. Medicaid
gives the states the
option to cover such care 49 and currently about one third of
50
the states do so.
Once an inspection determines that the nursing home is in compliance
with the Conditions of Participation and all other relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, a provider agreement is executed, which generally relates to
finances and reimbursement. Under Medicare, that agreement is made with
HHS. The nursing home binds itself not to charge recipients for services not
covered by Medicare, to refund any monies incorrectly collected from recipients, and to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin.5 1 A statement of financial
solvency is also prepared at the time the agreement is executed.
The Medicaid provider agreement is executed with the state Medicaid
agency, since Medicaid is a state administered program, but guidelines issued
by HHS govern the content of the agreement. The provider must agree to
keep adequate records showing services which have been provided to recipients. It must agree to disclose any information kept in those records, or other
records regarding payments claimed by the provider, to the state Medicaid
agency, HHS, or the state Medicaid fraud control unit, and to comply with all
financial disclosure requirements of the Medicaid statute. 52 Since the facility
receives federal matching funds, it must also comply with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.
In an effort to control improper financial dealings and fraud throughout
the health care industry, Congress has promulgated strict disclosure requirements for the two programs. 53 Any facility receiving Medicare or Medicaid
reimbursement must submit certain information to the government either at
the time of its annual survey, or upon request by the applicable state or federal
agency. That information relates to three areas; ownership of the reporting
facility, other facilities or subcontractors of the facility; 54 significant business
transactions with subcontractors or wholly-owned suppliers; 55 and Medicare
or Medicaid-related convictions of owners, agents or managing employees of
48. Butler, supra note 29, at 1322 n.29.

49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(15) (1976).
50.
51.
52.
53.

Wing & Craige, supra note 21, at 1183.
Health Insurance Benefits Agreement, SSA - 1561 (December, 1969).
42 C.F.R. § 431.107(b) (1980).
Id. §§ 420.202-.206, 455.103-.106.

54. The facility must identify: those with an ownership interest in the reporting facility; those
with an ownership or controlling interest in any subcontractor in which the disclosing entity has a
direct or indirect ownership of 5%or more; the name of any other provider in which an identified
individual has an ownership or controlling interest; and any of these individuals who are closely
related. Id. §§ 420.206, 455.104.

55. The facility must report its ownership of any subcontractor with whom it has had business transactions of $25,000 or more in the past year, and any significant business transactions

between it and wholly-owned suppliers or subcontractors within the last five years. Id.

§§ 420.205, 455.105.
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the facility.5 6 In addition Medicare requires a provider to disclose whether it
has hired an individual who7was employed by the facility's fiscal intermediary
5
during the preceding year.
The duration of the nursing home provider agreement is limited to one
year.58 Since the facility must be inspected prior to renewal of the agreement,
theoretically, the facility must at least yearly establish that it is in compliance
with all applicable state and federal regulations.5 9 Execution of the provider
agreement and compliance with the Conditions of Participation and other statutory provisions constitute certification. Attaining this status grants to the
nursing home all of the Medicare and Medicaid provider rights, benefits and

responsibilities.
C. Decertfcation
Decertification of a nursing home by HHS terminates its participation in
both the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 60 It is the most severe measure
that can be taken against a facility providing inadequate care. Therefore,
HHS and state Medicaid agencies by practice will only commence the decertification action after efforts by other means to bring the nursing home into
compliance have failed. 6 1 It can be invoked only upon a finding of failure to
comply with the statutory or regulatory provisions of Title XVIII or XIX,
breach of the provider agreement, failure to furnish information, or permit
56. Id. §§ 420.204, 455.106.
57. Id. § 420.203. The fiscal intermediary is the organization which actually administers the
Medicare program by determining the level of allowable reimbursement of covered services. 42
U.S.C. § 1395h (1976).
58. 42 C.F.R. § 489.15 (1980).
59. Note though, that upon finding that a facility is not in full compliance, the state agency or
HHS has the option of requiring the facility to develop and implement a plan of correction, and to
issue a conditional agreement so that the nursing home does not lose its certification. The practice
of issuing such conditional agreements is not uncommon. Id.
60. Provisions of the Medicare and Medicaid statutes indicate that a facility which is out of
compliance for purposes of one program will be considered as such for the other. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395cc(c)(2), 1396i (1976).
61. A number of interim measures can and will be taken to attempt to bring a facility into
compliance. A conditional provider agreement can be executed upon the facility's filing a plan of
correction; the facility can enter into consultation with the state certifying agency to attempt to
correct substandard conditions; or the state can enact civil penalty systems which exact monetary
fines for specified violations. See Butler, supra note 29.
North Carolina has never decertified a facility. Its reasoning is that first, the certification
agency, the Division of Facility Services, recognizes the severity of revoking the facility owner's
right to maintain this business; and second, because of the shortage of nursing home beds in North
Carolina, decertification may result in more harm to residents within the facility than would allowing the facility to remain operating. Another reason cited was the difficulty of actually proving
that a facility should be decertified in the hearing provided by the Medicare and Medicaid statutes.
Instead the State will work with the facility by granting conditional provider agreements
while offering consultation services in all aspects of facility operation.
The Department of Facility Services has a policy of not recommending decertification unless
it has found many substandard conditions in the facility, the facility has shown bad faith, and the
department has offered consultation which has been rejected or disregarded. Interview with Robert Robeson, Division of Facility Services of the State of North Carolina, in Raleigh, North Carolina (February 28, 1980).
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examination of financial records, making of fraudulent statements or excessiv,
requests regarding payment, furnishing excessive or inadequate quality healti
information on business transactions, owncare, or failure to furnish required
62
ership or criminal convictions.
The decertification process itself is a lengthy and complex one. 63 Although the Medicare and Medicaid programs each have their own appeals
process, the Medicare appeals process is most frequently used. 64 If a skilled
nursing facility is participating in Medicare and Medicaid, and the basis for
the Medicaid action is also one for Medicare, the state must give the facility
the option to use the Medicare or Medicaid appeals procedure, and notify the
by HHS under Medicare will be binding on its Medifacility that the decision
65
caid participaiton.
The Medicaid regulations establish minimum requirements for decertification procedures. 66 The state Medicaid agency must make an initial determination that there is sufficient cause to decertify a facility. Generally, this
information is acquired through the state's yearly facility inspection, or an inspection in response to resident complaints. Such a finding may also result
from a nursing home's failure to correct substandard conditions over the term
of a conditional provider agreement with the Medicaid agency. Notice to the
facility of the finding follows, and it then has a right to contest the determination.67 The state must provide an evidentiary hearing before the actual termination of participation, or within one hundred-twenty days of the date of
notice of the determination. 68 If the state opts for a post-termination hearing,
it must offer the facility an informal reconsideration to be carried out before
the effective date of the cessation of program payments. That reconsideration
must at a minimum provide written notice and bases for the determination to
decertify, an opportunity for the facility to refute the findings6 9 in writing and a
written affirmation or reversal of the state's initial findings.
The facility has a statutory right under Medicaid to appeal an initial or
reconsidered decertification determination through a full evidentiary hearing.
That administrative hearing must be before an impartial decisionmaker, with
the facility represented by counsel who can call witnesses, examine adverse
witnesses, and present documentary evidence. There must be a written deci62. 42 C.F.R. § 489.50 (1980).
63. The complexity of the process is due largely to the end which it may bring. Because
decertification may result in the termination of a nursing home's participation in Medicare and

Medicaid, it may effectively result in the termination of the facility's existence.
64. Provisions such as 42 C.F.R. 431.153(d) making a final decision entered under Medicare
procedures binding for purposes of Medicaid participation have had the practical effect of making
the Medicare decertification process the one most often used. When a skilled nursing facility is
certified to participate in both Medicare and Medicaid, and that facility is not in compliance with
the programs' conditions, the Medicare agency has practical jurisdiction over the facility's decertification. Its decision will be binding for Medicaid participation as well.
65. 42 C.F.R. § 431.153(d) (1980).

66. Id. §§ 431.151-.154.
67. Id. §§ 431.153-.154.
68. Id. § 431.153(b).
69. Id. § 431.154.
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sion stating the reasons for the affirmation
or reversal of the initial determina70
tion and the evidence relied upon.
The Medicare decertification and appeals procedure is carried out by
HHS. It begins with notice of its determination that the facility has shown
sufficient cause for decertification, its basis, and information on the nursing
home's right to appeal that determination. 71 The appeal takes place after the
facility's termination from the program pursuant to the initial determination.
The initial determination is generally based upon the results of the annual
survey of the facility, or one generated by resident complaints. The provider
will always receive a copy of this report. Decertification may also begin with a
determination by HHS not to renew a facility's provider agreement. It may
occur at the termination of the preceding year's agreement, or upon failure of
the facility to make those improvements specified in a conditional provider
agreement. Upon the determination not to renew a provider agreement, the
provider must request reconsideration by independent decisionmakers within
HHS before it may obtain a full administrative hearing.
If the nursing home opts for a hearing it must file a written request within
sixty days of receipt of its notice of determination or reconsideration. 72 The
request must state the specific contentions with which the facility disagrees,
and its basis for believing those contentions incorrect. 73 The hearing will be a
full evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge with the Bureau of
74
Hearing and Appeals of HHS.
The administrative law judge has the option of calling a prehearing conference to delineate the issues. 75 At the full hearing, counsel for both parties
are present and given an opportunity to present their case. Upon concluding,
the judge issues a decision confirming or reversing the decertification determination.
Either party can request review of the administrative law judge's decision
by HHS' appellate body, the Appeals Council. The Council must hear a request made by the facility, but can deny the government's request. It may
76
affirm, remand or reverse the judgment of the administrative law judge.
70. Id. § 431.153(c).
71. Id.§ 405.1503.
72. Id. §§ 405.1530-.1531.
73. Id. § 405.1531.
74. Id.§ 405.1533.
75. Id. § 405.1535. Witnesses and documents can be subpoenaed upon motion. Id.
§ 405.1544. At the hearing, both the facility and the government are represented by counsel, who
can call and cross-examine witnesses, file written documents for evidentiary purposes, and present
an oral summation. Id. §§ 405.1545, .1547, .1548. Upon conclusion, the AL must issue a written
decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. § 405.1557.
Either party can then timely request review of the AL's dismissal or decision by the Appeals
Council, consisting of at least two members of the council. The Appeals Council must hear the
request if made by the facility but can deny such a request by the government. Id. §§ 405.1561,
.1563. The parties file briefs and other written statements, and appear before the Appeals Council
to present evidence and oral arguments. Id. § 405.1564. The Council will consider only that
evidence presented at the initial hearing unless it believes new information is relevant to an issue
before it. .d. § 405.1565.
76. Id. § 405.1566(a).
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This decision is final and
binding unless the facility files an action for review
77
in federal district court.
There is some justification underlying this maze of federal regulations
governing nursing home participation. The availability of federal and state
funds to finance long term care has triggered alarming growth in the proprietary nursing home industry.78 Along with this growth have come instances of
exploitation of both reimbursed funds and the nursing home residents themselves.79 HHS hoped that it might be able to curtail abuse of the Medicare
and Medicaid programs by establishing new and more stringent standards in
areas such as facility staffing and services, residents' rights, and financial disclosure by providers. Whether all of this regulation has been effective is a
hotly debated question.
Questions can also be raised regarding the fairness of this decisionmaking
process with regard to its impact on individual nursing homes. The fifth
amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law.80 Due process has frequently been interpreted to require that
substantial procedural safeguards be provided individuals and private entities
adversely effected by government administrative decisionmaking. Individual
facilities and the industry as a whole have repeatedly claimed that the administrative procedures incident to Medicare and Medicaid decertification violate
their due process rights. An examination of the content of those challenges
and the judicial reaction to them follows.
Ill.
A.

TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF PROVIDER ENTITLEMENT CLAIMS

Entitlement

When first applied in the 1970 Supreme Court decision of Goldberg v.
Kelly,8 1 the entitlement concept was heralded by many as a basis for protecting individuals from arbitrary termination of government benefits and services. In Goldberg, the Court found that welfare benefits are statutory
entitlements for persons qualified to receive them,8 2 and therefore, that the

recipient has a protected interest in those benefits that cannot be terminated
without a hearing.
An exact definition of entitlement is difficult. It does not fall within the
concept of property as traditionally defined in common law, yet it is more than
a gratuity or privilege granted to the individual by the federal or state government.8 3 Those who enjoy the entitlement have satisfied standards and condi77. Id. § 405.1567.
78. See notes 21-35 and accompanying text supra.

79. See

SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM CARE OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,

NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY, INTRODUCTORY
REPORT, S. Rep. No. 93-1420, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); F. Moss & V. HALAmANDARIS, Too
OLD, Too SicK, Too BAD: NURSINO HOMES IN AMERICA (1977).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

81. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
82. Id. at 262.
83. Id. at 262 n.8.
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tions set by the government, and as long as they continue to meet those
criteria, they fully deserve their benefits or services. 84 It might best be termed
a "constitutionally protected interest."
The essential attribute of an entitlement is its classification as an interest
that comes within the protection of the due process clause of the fifth 85 and
fourteenth amendments.8 6 It is an interest which, at the least, cannot be deprotect the entitled individprived without minimum procedural safeguards to
87
ual from unjustified withdrawal of that interest.
The source of an entitlement is rooted in state action. 88 Major cases that
have found an individual entitled to a benefit have relied upon state action
such as statutory language, 89 regulations, 90 contracts, 9 1 or mutually explicit
understandings. 92 No matter what the source, the essential fact is that the
scope of the entitlement is defined by the state itself. The decision as to what
relationships rise to the level93of a protected interest is left principally to the
discretion of the legislatures.
The deference given by the courts to the state's determination of what
interests will constitute an entitlement has raised a number of doubts about the
continued use of the concept to protect individuals from arbitrary government
action.94 If recent decisions represent a trend, then state legislatures may be
permitted to narrow the protected interest by limiting the procedures incident
to its withdrawal. Without procedural safeguards, the entitlement is robbed of
its value. These concerns are not groundless. A plurality of the Supreme
Court inArnett v. Kennedy95 held that a statute creating a procedure for termination of government employment did not violate the Constitution despite its
84. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare". The EmergingLegal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.

1245, 1255 (1965).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

87. Procedural due process requirements are discussed in text accompanying notes 99-123
infra.
88. Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
89. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
90. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
91. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
92. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Other sources have noted that in addition to
state action, the individual must rely on the benefit obtained and must presently enjoy it. Id. at
564. See Note, Michigan Compulsory No-FaultInsurance Law Violates Due Process, B.Y.U. L.
REv. 433, 440 (1979).
93. Comment, Entitlement,Enjoyment and Due Processof Law, 1974 DuKE L.J. 89, 103.
94. Van Alstyne, Cracksin "The New Property" Adjudicative Property in the Administrative
State, 62 CORNELL L. REV.445 (1977); Comment, supra note 93, at 110-11; Note, From Goss to
Bishop: The Demise ofthe Entitlement Doctrine, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 523 (1978); Note, Statutory
Entitlement and the Concept of Property, 86 YALE L.J. 695, 706 (1977).
95. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Thesejustices found that Kennedy did have an entitlement, but said
that the very statute which gave him that right expressly provided also for the procedure by which
the rioht was terminated, and expressly omitted the procedural guarantees mandated by the Constitution. Note, From Goss to Bishop, supra note 94, at 529.
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insufficiency by constitutional due process standards, even though the employment under the statute constituted an entitlement for analytic purposes. This
finding that an independent due process analysis need not be applied deprived
the entitlement doctrine of its major purpose; individual protection from arbitrary withdrawal of government benefits. The remaining Justices in Arnett
maintained that an independent due process analysis must be applied once a
statute has been found to create an entitlement.
Another manifestation of the deference given to the states by the federal
courts appeared in Bishop v. Wood. 96 In that case, the Supreme Court accepted an extremely narrow interpretation given a municipal ordinance by the
North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina federal district court
to reach a conclusion that there was no entitlement. Its deference to the questionable interpretation of the other courts on the issue of the existence of an
97
entitlement was virtually complete.
It remains to be seen whether the entitlement doctrine will eventually be
emptied of any protective value it may have for the individual confronted with
threatened termination of a protected interest. The Supreme Court has not
abandoned the doctrine altogether, nor has the court been consistent in its
application. A majority of thejustices inArnett supported the preservation of
an independent due process analysis, and two recent Supreme Court decisions
have given some support for the notion that the terms life, liberty and property
in the due process clause have meaning outside of the strict confines of provisions of positive law. 98 The procedural safeguards enunciated in Goldberg are
an effective weapon in limiting governmental power. As long as there is some
life in the Goldberg doctrine, efforts to secure independent due process standards will continue.
B. Mandates of an Independent Due ProcessAnalysis
Upon FindingAn Entitlement
The fifth 99 and fourteenth amendments 1°° provide that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The goal of
due process is the protection of individuals from arbitrary or erroneous withdrawal of their constitutionally protected interests.
96. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
97. On its face the ordinance on which petitioner relies may fairly be read as conferring
such a guarantee. However, such a reading is not the only possible interpretation; the
ordinance may also be construed as granting no right to continued -employment but
merely conditioning an employee's removal on compliance with certain specified procedures....
The [North Carolina Federal] District Court's reading of the ordinance is tenable; it
derives some support from a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court,. . . and it
was accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. These reasons are sufficient to foreclose our independent examination of the state law issue.
Id. at 345, 347.
98. Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
99. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
100. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are adequate
notice and an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner".' 0 ' Because due process must protect innumerable types of
interests with varying levels of importance, it is by no means a standard set of
procedures consistently applied to all situations meriting procedural protections. It is a flexible doctrine, and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands. 10 2
When reviewing existing procedures, courts are faced with the challenge
of first determining whether or not the procedures sufficiently protect the interest involved. If they are found insufficient, the court must tailor a set of procedures that meet the circumstances of the individual case before it.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,103 the Supreme Court articulated the factors that
should be considered when identifying the dictates of due process in any given
situation. By drawing on the reasoning of its prior decisions, the Court found
it necessary to balance three interests:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.' °4
The private interest involved is that of the individual threatened with the
termination of a protected interest. In general, there is an interest in the uninterrupted receipt of the benefit or services. 10 5 Courts have most often determined the weight to be given this uninterrupted receipt by the effect the
deprivation of that interest would have on the individual. One consideration
10 6
is the degree of potential harm that may be created by a particular decision.
The individual may be deprived of subsistence, 10 7 his livelihood,10 8 or may be
faced with a threat to health and safety. 10 9 Another factor often considered is
the length of the wrongful deprivation. 110 The longer the period the individ101. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).

102. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation").
103. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

104. Id. at 335. The Court's decision in Eldridge has set a pattern for subsequent adjudication
of procedural due process issues. Once they have found a constitutionally recognized interest,
federal courts have almost invariably employed the Eldridge balancing test when judging the adequacy of a challenged procedure. Note, Mathews v. Eldridge,Reviewed- A FairTest on Balance,

67 GEO. LJ. 1407, 1412 (1979).
105. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340.

106. Id. at 341 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
107. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 264.

108. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
109. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
110. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 341 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389

(1975)).
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ual is erroneously denied the benefits, services or employment, the greater the
harm he suffers. A final consideration is whether the individual can be made
whole if it is later discovered that the termination was erroneous. 111
An erroneous termination of a protected interest subjects the individual to
undeserved and needless harm. Therefore, the second factor which must be
weighed in the Eldridge balancing test is the risk that existing procedures may
produce an erroneous deprivation. The procedures need not comply with
standards that assure perfect, error-free determinations, 112 but they should be
shaped by "the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to
the generality of cases". 1 13 Analysis of the degree of risk of an incorrect termination involves twb related aspects of the procedures used: their accuracy, and
the type of factual determination to be made by the procedure." 4 For example, if the determination is one based on objective data, such as prior driving
records, police reports or medical records, there is a smaller risk of error than
if it is based upon subjective findings such as credibility or fault; 115 or, if the
procedures give the individual an opportunity to appear informally before an
there is a greater probability that
official involved in the decision to terminate,
1 16
the decision will be an accurate one.
The final interest considered in the Eldridge test is the governmental interest in terminating benefits and services to those ineligible to receive them.
This interest is basically twofold. Procedures provided by the government for
termination of a protected interest will often be the minimum it considers required. When a court weighs the possibility of imposing more stringent procedural safeguards on the state or federal government, it creates potential
problems. Increased hearings will burden the government both administratively and financially. 117 The court must weigh these administrative and
financial costs against the benefits to be derived from fewer erroneous deprivations. A second and extremely important determination the court must make
is whether the denial of summary deprivation procedures to the states will
impede the government's interest in the performance of its public protection
functions." 18 These functions include the continued smooth operation of public institutions,' 1 9 and the protection of the public's health and safety. 120 IM111. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977). See also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11

(1979).
112. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 13 (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442
U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
113. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 14 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344).
114. Note, supra note 104, at 1419, 1420.

115. The distinction between subjective and objective data often goes to the timing of the
hearing, whether it will be pre- or post-termination. Note the results in accordance with this
distinction in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. at 113; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343; Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. at 269. Courts will also consider who is evaluating the data. Barry v. Barchi, 443
U.S. at 65.
116. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 65; Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 15; Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 at 18.
117. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 347.
118. Note, supra note 104, at 1417.
119. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 65.
120. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. at 114; Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 17.
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portant "public" interests are accorded a great deal of weight,2 1 and are often
found sufficiently important to outweigh the private interest.'
Each of the Eldridge factors are then examined in relation to one another.
Those the court considers of greater relative importance will outweigh others.
The result is a set of procedures that reflect the court's ordering of priorities,
and basically ensure that the entitlement will not be erroneously deprived.
The due process balancing approach leaves a great deal of discretion to
the courts in fashioning appropriate procedures to protect constitutional interests. It has been argued by some commentators that this approach provides
insufficient guidance to the courts, and so results in a lack of any distinct due
process standards in the decisions.1 2 2 Federal courts have adopted the Eldridge balancing approach in their treatment of nursing home challenges to
existing decertification procedures. That approach, contrary to critics' charges,
has produced consistent results in these cases. 123
C ProviderEntitlement to ContinuedParicipationin The Medicare
andMedicaidPrograms
The treatment of provider entitlement claims by the federal courts began
with the following statement: "It is clear that Mrs. Case has a property interest
124
in her expectation of continued participation in the Medicaid program."'
This holding in Case v. Weinberger was the first of several cases brought by
nursing home proprietors against the former Department of Health, Education
and Welfare challenging the procedures for termination from the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Subsequent decisions have not departed from the
holding in Case, nor have they elaborated to any great extent on its justifications.'

25

The court in Case obliquely indicated the basis for its holding by citing
Boardof Regents v. Roth, 126 but it did not discuss the case. 127 Hathaway v.
121. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
122. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CalculusforAdministrativeAdjudiation
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 28
(1977).
123. See notes 142-70 and accompanying text infra.
124. Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 1975).
125. Unlike the federal courts, state courts have provided more guidance for ascertaining bases for finding a provider entitlement. See, e.g., Paramount Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Department of Health Care Servs., 15 Cal. 3d 489, 542 P.2d 1, 125 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976); Marshall
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Aggrey, 50 Ohio Ap. 2d 15, 361 N.E.2d 522 (1976); Shady Acres Nursing
Home, -Inc. v. Canary, 3 Ohio App. 2d T, 316 N.E.2d 481 (1973).
126. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) was the first Supreme Court case to discuss
the elements of a protected interest in a government benefit or relationship. See notes 88-92 and
accompanying text supra.
127. There is a federal district court which based its finding of a provider entitlement on Board
ofRegents. After quoting the Supreme Court opinion at length, it found that nursing home operators had more than an abstract need or desire to retain *patients for whom public support is
received, as well as more than a unilateral expectation of doing so. It concluded that the provider
had a claim of entitlement grounded in the statute defining eligibility. Ross v. Wisconsin Dept. of
Health and Social Servs., 369 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wisc. 1973).
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Mathews, 128 decided a year after Case, grounded its finding of a provider entitlement on the fact that once enacted, Medicaid had created expectations on
the part of both consumers and providers of health care.1 2 9 It concluded that
the federal government could not terminate Medicaid payments without providing notice1 30and a hearing to the person who is to be deprived of the statutory
entitlement.
In Washington Nursing Center v. Quern 13 1 a federal district court applied
the holdings in Case andHathaway to a provider's challenge of a termination
from a state program providing supplemental Medicaid reimbursement to facilities that were experiencing financial hardship. The court stated:
What the cases cited [Hathaway and Case] do establish.

. .

is that

the institutional plaintiffs through their expectation of continuing to
receive Medicaid payments on behalf of their patients, have a property right protected under the132Constitution which cannot be deprived
without due process of law.
Cases decided since Washington Nursing Center have assumed without
question that there is a provider entitlement to continued participation in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.13 3 Two of these cases, however, have
rested their findings on much narrower grounds than the expectation of continued participation.1 34 In the most recent of these cases, Green v. Cashman,
the court asserted that whatever rights the provider had arose exclusively from
its provider agreement with the state. 135 It found little persuasion in the "expectation" argument, stating that there was nothing in the Medicare or Medicaid statutes that would indicate an intention to provide financial assistance to
health care providers foi their own benefit. The statute,136the court continued,
was designed to aid only the patients of such facilities.

A finding of a provider entitlement based purely on the contract rights
created by the provider agreement would indicate that there is a distinction
between a decertification decision based upon termination of an existing provider agreement, and one based upon a decision not to renew an expired provider agreement. If the entitlement is based solely in the provider agreement,
then theoretically it should end when the provider agreement expires, thereby
128. 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976).

129. Id. at 230.
130. Id. at 232.

131. 442 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Il1. 1977).
132. Id. at 26.
133. Green v. Cashman, 605 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1979); Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v.
Beal, 586 F.2d 266, 277 (3d Cir. 1978); Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978); Greenspan v. Klein, 442 F. Supp. 860 (D.N.J. 1977).

134. Green v. Cashman, 605 F.2d at 946; Greenspan v. Klein, 442 F. Supp. at 861.
135. 605 F.2d at 946.
136. Id. The legislative intent argument that the court used here, in the large majority of

cases, has not been applied at this stage of the inquiry into provider entitlement, but at the stage of
inquiry, when the court is deciding upon the timing of the hearing to challenge the termination of

participation. See notes 142-70 and accompanying text infra. Second, this legislative intent argument may not be a correct one. A number of commentators assert that one of the purposes behind
structuring the Medicare and Medicaid programs as they are, was to keep the private health care

industry intact and operating. See notes 180-97 and accompanying text infra.
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making irrelevant any consideration in that situation of what procedures are
required upon terminating an existing entitlement.
Although a number of state courts have adopted this distinction,1 37 the
federal courts have not been willing to accept it. Town Court Nursing Center,
Inc. v. Beai' 38 involved a refusal to renew the provider agreement of a nursing
home. When HEW tried to bring out this distinction, the court rejected it,
stating that the legal effects of calling the decertification the termination of an
ongoing provider agreement or a refusal to renew an expired agreement were
irrelevant. 139 Town Court had preceded Green's recognition of the provider
agreement as the sole source of the provider's interest by a year, but in June,
1980, the Supreme Court cited the Third Circuit's decision with approval.
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. 140 arose out of the same
decertification proceeding as the lower court decision, but addressed the issue
of resident, rather than provider, entitlement. The nursing home had not appealed the lower court's decision, but the Supreme Court, in text and footnote,
mentioned the Third Circuit's unanimous holding regarding the provider entitlement issue and repeated that court's holding that the procedures for termination were sufficient to protect Town Court's property interests. 141
While questions regarding the basis for finding an entitlement can still be
raised, at the present time it appears that most courts are willing to find that
nursing homes subject to decertification are entitled to due process protection.
As will be shown below, it has been the sufficiency of procedures rather than
137. These cases arose out of state Medicaid agencies' decisions not to renew expired provider
agreements. Facility owners challenged these decisions, asserting that they were entitled to a hearing in which the state should justify its decision not to renew. The Ohio courts rejected this
argument by finding that the Medicaid statute placed a one year limit on provider agreements,
that the provider agreement was the source of the facility's entitlement and that therefore the
entitlement ended upon expiration of the agreement. The facility's expectation in continued participation alone was not sufficient to constitute an entitlement. Marshall Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Aggrey, 50 Ohio App. 2d 15, 361 N.E.2d 522 (1976); Shady Acres Nursing Home, Inc. v. Canary,
30 Ohio App. 2d 47, 316 N.E.2d 481 (1973).
A more detailed explanation for the rejection of this argument was given by the California
Supreme Court in Paramount Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Department of Health Care Services,
15 Cal. 3d 489, 542 P.2d 1, 125 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976). Using a traditional property interest analysis, the court distinguished this situation from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), or the teacher in Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) by stating that m
those cases the chief beneficiary of the entitlement was the person who claimed the right to the
hearing, whereas here, the facility was not the primary beneficiary of the program. 15 Cal. 3d at
497, 542 P.2d at 5, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 269. The court also distinguished this case from Perry v.
Sinderman on another basis. Although both situations involved a one year contract, the regulations under the Medi-Cal program made clear to the nursing home that it would have to show its
compliance with applicable federal regulations. This was completely unlike the regulations and
practices at the college in Perry which had established a de facto tenure system which promised
continued employment. Id. at 498, 542 P.2d at 6, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 270. Like the Ohio courts, the
California court concluded that the expectation in the renewal of the provider agreement was not
sufficient to constitute an entitlement. Id. at 498-99, 542 P.2d at 6, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
138. 586 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1978).
139. Id. at 268 n.l. The court based its conclusion on a reading of the regulations. Save one
exception, the regulations had no difference in the methods of review of initial decisions to terminate and initial decisions not to renew an existing provider agreement.
140. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
141. Id. at 778 n.6.
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the existence of the protected interest which has presented the courts with the
more challenging issue.
D. Sufficiency of ProceduralDue Process Upon Finding
a ProviderEntitlement

An entitlement analysis for due process purposes involves two questions.
As discussed in the preceding section: does the individual have an interest of
sufficient import in the government program to merit its protection from arbitrary termination? If so, what procedures are due or necessary to protect that
interest from arbitrary termination?
The HHS decertification appeals process 14 2 has frequently been challenged by providers. They claim that the available procedures are constitutionally insufficient to protect their interest in continued participation in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs. Much of the controversy in the past decade has centered around the timing of the full administrative hearing available
to providers threatened with decertification. 143 HHS has consistently asserted
that a hearing, if requested by the nursing home, should be offered after the
termination of program funding to the facility. Providers however, have
claimed that the hearing must be available before termination of the actual
payments in order to meaningfully and sufficiently protect their entitlement.
Relying heavily on Goldberg and Eldridge, courts confronted with this
issue have reached a decision regarding the proper timing of the administrative hearing by balancing the competing interests involved in the decertification proceeding. 144 Those interests are the provider's private interest in
continued participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and the government's interest in the termination of unqualified providers from the programs. A third factor considered by the courts is the risk of an erroneous
145
deprivation of the provider's interest under the existing procedures.
The provider's private interest is expressed in financial terms. They claim
that the denial of continuing Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement will force
them out of business. 146 This financial dependence of the nursing home on its
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement is readily admitted by the facilities,
and is borne out by statistics. 147
142. See notes 60-77 and accompanying text supra.
143. Although the timing issue has been in the forefront for the past decade, one can speculate
regarding other challenges to the provider appeals process which may arise in the future. The
fairness of the substance of the administrative review will likely be questioned, with challenges to
the adequacy of evidence such as the survey report, or to the presence of conflicting testimony

regarding facility compliance.

144. Green v. Cashiman, 605 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1979); Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v.
Beal, 586 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1978); Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1976); Case v.
Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975); Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D. N.Y.

1978); Washington Nursing Center v. Quern, 442 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Il1. 1977).
145. This balancing test is basically that articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
146. See, eg., Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d at 607.
147. For example, in Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d at 230, all of the residents of the facility
were Medicaid recipients. In Paramount Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Department of Health Care
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The government interests involved in a nursing home decertification action are the protection of the residents, and the administrative and financial
burdens resulting from a requirement of a pretermination administrative hearing. When the alleged violations of the facility place the health, safety or lives
of the residents in jeopardy, the courts readily hold that the government has a
strong interest in protecting the residents' lives. 148 This interest is rooted in
the Medicare and Medicaid statutes. The courts note that the residents are the
intended beneficiaries of the two programs, as the foremost legislative intent
of
49
Congress was the provision of medical care to the aged and the needy.'
The second consideration in assessing the government's interest in the
post-termination hearing is the financial and administrative burden involved
in continued funding of a nursing home pending a final adjudication of the
decertification challenge. The proceedings before an administrative law judge,
the Appeals Council, the federal district court, and finally, the appellate courts
can take months, if not years. Continued reimbursement to a provider HHS
believes to be unqualified to care for its elderly residents would entail substantial sums considering the amounts already 150
being spent to fund nursing home
care by the federal and state governments.
The final factor considered is the risk of erroneous termination of the
provider's participation in the programs under existing procedures. This requires an examination of the accuracy of the decisionmaking process itself,
and of opportunities that a provider may have to correct any errors that have
been made in that process. If the initial decertification determination is based
upon an annual survey, that report contains defined criteria for evaluation.
The provider has an opportunity to respond in writing to the findings of the
survey team; and may submit additional evidence after notice of deficiency is
given. The evidentiary basis of the recommendation of the survey team is
fully disclosed to the provider.15 ' In some cases, providers are given the opportunity to meet informally with HHS or the state Medicaid agency before
the final decertification decision is made.I5 2 Many providers have also had an
opportunity, even before the formal decertification procedure has begun, to
submit a plan of correction of existing violations and execute a conditional
short term provider agreement.
Within the courts' balancing of the interests at stake, there are some factors that carry greater weight. When the facility has engaged in informal
Services, 125 Cal. Rptr. 265, 271 n.6, 542 P.2d 1,7 n.6 (1975), the facility candidly admitted that it
was unable to function with private patients alone. According to amicus curiae, the California
Association of Health Facilities, the overwhelming majority of nursing homes were in the same
position. See note 31 and text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
148. See, e.g., Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d at 607; Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal,
568 F.2d at 278; Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. at 1046.
149. Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d at 607; Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d
at 277. But see text accompanying notes 180-97 infra regarding the legislative intent behind the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.
150. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d at 278.
151. Id. at 277-78.
152. Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d at 607; Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. at 1046.
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pretermination procedures with the Medicare or Medicaid agency, such as
meetings and negotiations, the risk that an error may have been made before
the implementation of the decertification decision is greatly reduced.1 53 The
provider will have had an opportunity to examine the survey report and make
needed corrections. In some situations, the facility may even have admitted
the charged violations.1 54 All of these communications lessen the weight the
court need give to the risk of an erroneous decertification by post-termination
administrative hearings.
The factor weighing most heavily in the government's interest in the
prompt termination of payments is the existence of conditions in the nursing
home threatening the lives and safety of the residents. Given an emergency
situation and an individual provider interest diminished by previous opportunities to dispute agency
findings, judges have recognized a need for summary
1 55
government action.
The provider's interest in continued participation in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs has consistently been given less weight than that of the
government by courts facing this issue.1 56 Commentators on that individual
interest have noted that the provider is a corporation claiming financial hardship, not an individual deprived of all sources of income; 157 and that the provider's "need" for patients, and the reimbursement they bring, has nothing to
do with the statutory benefits structure.' 5 8 Indeed, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Case v. Weinberger159 held that "[t]he facility's need is incidental. That a particular nursing facility cannot survive without Medicaid participation was certainly not Congress' foremost consideration in its creation of the
160
Medicaid program."
Case involved a facility that had had numerous informal pretermination
meetings with HHS. Its violations were of the Life Safety Code, HHS' fire
prevention regulations. In the view of HHS, the nursing home's noncompliance threatened the lives and safety of the residents. Giving strong weight to
the emergency situation and the minimal chance of an erroneous decision, the
court held that a post-termination full administrative hearing was sufficient to
protect the interest of the provider.16 1 Schwartberg v. Califano,162 and Town
153. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1978); Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975); Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
154. Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d at 605.
155. Id. at 606 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, n.10 (1970)); Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. at 1046.
156. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1978); Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975); Schwartzberg v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
157. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d at 277.
158. Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d at 607.
159. 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975).
160. Id. at 607. Only the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has given great weight to the
individual interest deprived by the termination of government payments. That is because the
court in Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d at 230-31, believed the individual interest at stake was
not only that of the provider, but also that of the residents faced with transfer to a different facility.
161. Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d at 608-09.
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Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beai' 63 dealt similarly with the fact situations
that paralleled Case, holding that under these circumstances a post-termination hearing sufficiently protected the nursing homes' interest in continued
164
participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Hathaway v. Mathews 165 stands alone to date as the only federal case
finding that a pretermination administrative hearing was necessary to protect
private interests in Medicare and Medicaid participation. The decision was
based, however, on a relatively unique fact situation. Unlike Case, Schwartzberg, and Town Court, the provider in Hathaway had no opportunity for informal meetings of negotiations with HHS. It had merely received a letter
notifying it of its noncompliance. 66 Another unusual feature of the case was
the position of the state Medicaid agency, which contended that the facility
was in compliance with the regulations governing intermediate care facilities.' 67 The lack of agreement between the state and federal government agencies indicated genuine questions as to whether any violations constituting a
threat to residents' lives existed.
The court's conclusion relied heavily upon the strong possibility of error
and uncertainty in the federal government's initial decertification decision and
the lack of any emergency situation. It agreed with the Second Circuit's holding in Case that had there been an emergency situation, a post-termination
hearing would have been sufficient.168
This examination of the traditional analysis of provider entitlement
claims leaves two conclusions. There is a general consensus among the federal
courts that nursing home owners do have an interest in continued participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, 169 and that where the lives or
safety of the residents are threatened, that interest is sufficiently protected by a
170
post-termination evidentiary hearing.
Nevertheless, these conclusions leave several questions unanswered. Is an
162. 453 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1978):
163. 586 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1978).
164. In another case growing out of the Town Court decertification proceedings, the Supreme
Court also noted the Third Circuit's holding regarding the provider entitlement issue. O'Bannon
v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 778 n.6 (1980).
165. 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976).
166. Id. at 232.
167. Id. at 230.
168. Hathaway was decided in 1976. Given the coming period of fiscal conservatism, one can
only speculate as to whether that decision would be repeated if heard again in 1980. Town Court,
a 197 decision recently noted in a related Supreme Court decision, made specific mention of the
strong public interest in preserving scarce financial and administrative resources, and the high cost

of providing pretermination hearings. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d at 278,
citedin O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc., 447 U.S. at 773 n.6.
169. See text accompanying notes 124-141 supra.
170. See notes 142-166 and accompanying text supra. At first reading, the "life and safety
threatening" language would seem to substantially limit those situations in which a p ost-terminaion hearing would sufficiently protect provider interests. But, as the cases bear out, it is-generally
only those facilities with emergency situations which the state or federal government will attempt
to decertify. This is due to several factors. Chief among them are the great need for certified
nursing home beds, the harsh financial results for the decertified provider, and the difficulty of
proof in a decertification action.
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entitlement analysis appropriate in the nursing home decertification situation?
Is the provider really an unintended beneficiary of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs? Is the government's interest in protecting the lives and safety of
nursing home residents best served by decertification? These, and other issues
presented by the court's standard analysis of nursing home decertification
questions, will be addressed next.
IV.

THE ENTITLEMENT ANALYSIS IN NURSING HOME DECERTIFICATION:

DOES IT WoRK?

.4. The FirstStep of the Entitlement Anaysis: Factors
Not ConsideredBy Courts
When faced with a nursing home's challenge to the Medicare/Medicaid
decertification process, courts have consistently applied the entitlement analy17 1
sis to determine the proper amount of protection owed the nursing home.
This analysis looks to the provider within the programs. It examines the statutory, regulatory and contractual relationships between government and nursing home. The legal result is generally a determination that the facility has a
property interest in its continued participation in the programs that cannot be
terminated without a hearing. The practical result is generally the termination
of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement to the facility pending an evidentiary hearing on the subject. The residents within the facility are consequently
transferred to another qualified nursing home; yet the transfer may result in
increased morbidity and mortality among them. Nursing home residents often
form strong psychological bonds with their environment. A sudden move to
another facility can traumatize the resident, causing sickness or death. 172
Furthermore, the number of qualified beds available in the state is often
insufficient to house those residents being transferred, and those beds that are
available may be hundreds of miles from residents' family and friends. Unlike
the situation with hospitals, the demand for nursing home care constantly exceeds the supply of beds. This is for several reasons. States, in enacting their
Medicaid programs, may establish eligibility standards that leave it with more
eligible persons than its nursing home bed supply can support. The Certificate
of Need program, 173 enacted to prevent overutilization by limiting nursing
home and hospital expansion and construction, maintains a set level of beds to
meet what the state determines the need should be.174 And finally, increased
longevity due to improved treatment of many acute diseases, has resulted in a
growing population of older individuals With chronic diseases and conditions
171. See text accompanying notes 124-170 supra.
172. See Roberson v. Wood, 464 F. Supp. 983, 986 (E.D. 11. 1979); Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F.

Supp. 436, 452 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
173. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k300t (1976).
174. Feder & Scanlon, Regulating the Bed Supply in Nursing Homes, MiLBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q.: HEALTH AND Soc'Y 54 (Winter 1980). For example, in North Carolina of the 19,615
beds in the state, 96-98% are occupied. Shortage ofBeds PlaguesNorth CarolinaNursingHomes,
Raleigh News and Observer, Feb., 17, 1980, at 6, col. 1.
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who cannot be cared for by families at home. Ultimately, the decertification
of a nursing home leaves the publicly supported health care system with one
less facility to meet the ever-increasing demand for long term care, and, ironically, the attempt to maintain the quality of the existing facilities may result in
the death or disability of some member of the class such efforts are intended to
protect.
These human factors are as much a part of a nursing home decertification
as a provider's alleged breach of its statutory or contractual relationship with
the government. A legal analysis that considers only the provider and government directly interested in the nursing home's decertification seems decidedly
narrow.175 Yet, this is precisely the legal effect of the entitlement analysis traditionally used in the case law.
There are also several aspects of Medicare and Medicaid that set them
apart from other government programs providing benefits or services to individuals. The Medicare and Medicaid programs directly involve three parties,
government, provider and recipient of services, whereas other government
programs essentially involve only two, government and recipient. The traditional entitlement analysis is more easily applied in the two party situation, as
each of the parties' interests is more clearly defined.' 76 However, when the
entitlement analysis is applied in the Medicare and Medicaid nursing home
decertification context, in which the interests of three parties will be effected,
difficulties arise. A doctrine whose analysis has been limited to the consideration of the relationship between only two parties may be wholly inadequate in
a context requiring the determination of the interests of three parties in an
entitlement program. When a nursing home is being decertified, all parties in
fact have a large stake in the result.
Resolution of this question of interests in the federal health care programs
should begin with an examination of congressional intent at the time of their
enactment. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the statutory authorization
for the Medicaid program, authorizes appropriations to the states for the purpose of enabling them to furnish medical and rehabilitative services to families
with dependent children and to aged, blind or disabled individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services. 177 Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, Medicare, although not stating
such a purpose specifically, has been repeatedly held to have been enacted to
insure that adequate medical care is available to the aged and disabled former
175. The issue of the residents' interest in a nursing home's decertification was decided by the
Supreme Court in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980). The Court

considered the issue to be whether a patient has an interest in receiving care in a particular facility

that entitles him/her to a hearing before the government can decertify that facility. The Court
held that the decertification of a nursing home has an impact on the residents which is only indi-

rect and incidental, and that the due process clause does not protect such indirect interests. Only
the government and the provider were parties with a direct interest in the facility's decertification.
176. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

177. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
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wage earners throughout the country. 178 A senate report on the legislation
that was to become Medicare and Medicaid clearly stated that an overall purpose of the bill was to provide a coordinated approach for health insurance
and medical care for beneficiaries under the Social Security Act, and to make
medical services for the needy more generally available. 179 The recipient of
medical services under either of these programs was intended to be the principal beneficiary in the program.180
Yet the Medicare and Medicaid programs were also enacted with the intention that the private health care system provide the needed services. The
concept of nationalized health insurance with publicly-owned and controlled
health care facilities was not politically feasible in 1965. The sentiments of a
majority of Congress clearly ran against the idea and supported instead a major role for the private health care industry in a system of governmental reimbursement for the provision of medical services for certain categories of
beneficiaries.
There were also several major forces acting upon Congress in its attempt
to establish health care reform measures in 1965, not the least of which were
representatives of the health care establishment such as Blue Cross of
America, the American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association,18 ' and the American Nursing Home Association. The provider representatives' great objection to the Medicare portion of the 1965 legislation was
its insurance concept of supplying health care to all persons over sixty-five
years old without regard to financial need.18 2 This program, they believed,
was too close to a nationalized health insurance concept, which could potentially disrupt the private health care system. The American Hospital Association repeatedly threatened Congress with a boycott by the core providers of
services under Medicare--the hospitals, if there was any federal interference
in hospital operations. 8 3 As a result, Medicare was conceived as a federally
funded hospital insurance program, which essentially mimicked the private
health insurance industry in terms of organization and administration.' 8 4 The
system diverged from existing private health insurance programs only in that
the source of payment would be different. Participation in that portion of
Medicare which covered physician's services was optional and required pay178. See Turecamo v. Commissioner, 554 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1977); Hultzman v. Weinberger,
495 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1974); Diplomat Lakewood, Inc. v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 442 (D.D.C.
1978); Lord v. Richardson, 356 F.Supp. 232 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
179. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., rearintedin[1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1943-44; Medicaid,the Crazy Patchwork Quilt, 5 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 62 (April 1969).
180. This interest was clarified in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773
(1980), where the Supreme Court stated that the government cannot withdraw patients' benefits
without notice and a hearing.
181. S.LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG 32 (1977).

182. Hearingson Medical Careforthe Aged"Hearingson H.. 3920 Before the House Comm
on Ways andMeans, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1863 (1964).
183. A witness for the AHA at hearings on Medicare explained: "We believe that a free hospital system should be afforded the right to decide upon the administration of any program through
which they elect to provide their services." LAW, supra note 181, at 38.
184. R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 50 (1974).
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ment of a monthly premium. The doctors and hospitals would be reimbursed
according to their reasonable charges, and the patient could be charged more
than Medicare would reimburse.18 5 The law specifically stated that the federal
government would not supervise or control the practice of medicine, or the
provision of medical services in health care facilities. 18 6 Essentially, the broad
assumption was that the Medicare
program would be quietly absorbed into the
18 7
private "mainstream" system.
The Medicaid program was more a form of public assistance than health
insurance.' 88 The provisions of the 1965 legislation that became Medicaid
were strengthening an already existing program of medical assistance to the
needy aged. 189 They were far less controversial than the Medicare provisions
because Medicaid was still based on a financial means test. The program was
designed along the lines of existing welfare programs, appropriating funds to
the state to distribute according to federal and state guidelines. The plan dif90
fered from welfare, however, in incorporating the vendor payment system.1
The system, rather than allocating money for the purchase of health care directly to program recipients, reimbursed providers for medical services given
recipients. The American Nursing Home Association had endorsed the KerrMills legislation, a forerunner to Medicaid, and in 1965 urged a strengthening
of that legislation rather than the enactment of Medicare. 191 In 1964, testifying on an earlier version of the Medicare legislation that failed to pass, the
Association articulated its position on reimbursement for nursing home
care. 192 It contended that only with increased payments could nursing home
care improve; and that where reimbursement levels were highest, the availability of nursing home beds was greatest. 193 The legislation that became Medicaid did indeed strengthen and increase payment to proprietary nursing
homes. Here again, the desire to give the private94health care industry a major
role in the government program was revealed.1
The 1972 amendments to the Medicare and Medicaid programs 195 re185. T. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 82 (1973).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1974).
187. R. STEVENS, supra note 184, at 50.
188. See generally R. STEVENS, supra note 184; B. HOLAHAN, FINANCING HEALTH CARE FOR
THE POOR: THE MEDICAID EXPERIENCE (1975); Bernard & Feingold, The Impact of Medicaid,

1970 Wis. L.REv. 726.
189. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-87, § 403(a), 79 Stat. 290 (1965) (repealed 1974).'

190. One of the original reasons for payment to vendors rather than beneficiaries was a fear by
state welfare administrative agencies that direct beneficiary payments would result in beneficiaries
absconding with the money, and beneficiaries obtaining inadequate care with the money. STEVENS, supra note 184, at 22-23.

191. Hearings on Medical Careforthe 4ged" Executive Hearingson H.. 1 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 330 (1965) (statement of Roy J. McDonald).
192. Hearings,supra note 182, at 1866.
193. Id.
194. At least one commentator has stated that the price of giving the private health care system a major role in Medicaid has been the extremely rapid rise in health care costs, both to the

government and private individuals. R. STEVENS, supra note 184, at 202.
195. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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flected a shift in congressional thinking from the provision of comprehensive
medical services to concern with the rapidly rising costs of the programs. Although not altering the basic structure of the private health care industry's role
in Medicare and Medicaid, conditions were placed on its participation.
Among them were the required establishment of utilization review plans to
19 6
and compliance
discourage prolonged hospital and nursing home stays,
97
with certificate of need for major capital expenditures.1
While a detailed list of all the Medicare and Medicaid provisions reflecting the needs of providers has not been presented, it is certain that those needs
have been a part of the explicit and implicit objectives of this legislation as
passed, and as amended. Medicare and Medicaid are diverse and complicated
programs that serve a number of objectives. Although the statute and legislative history have the express purpose of providing medical services to the aged
and needy, there is also an intention to preserve the private health care system
and, perhaps, an unstated intention to forestall any system of nationalized
health insurance.
More importantly, for some kinds of providers, Congress set up a system
that became their lifeblood. The support of the long term care concept as a
less expensive alternative to hospital care stimulated construction in the field
almost unheard of in the health care industry. 19 8 The programs provided

funds for growth of the nursing home industry without which such growth
could not have taken place. 199 The fact that Medicare and Medicaid finance
fifty-one percent of nursing home care in the United States 2°° attests to the
critical role played by those programs in the financial survival of the industry.
Given federal programs with such diverse objectives, situations will inevitably arise when the interests of the elderly recipients and nursing homes will
conflict. One such situation is a nursing home decertification. At first glance,
one might assert that the interests of the two parties are the same; both want to
continue to receive or provide care in the same facility. But that is when the
similarity ends. The conflict of interests becomes evident upon examining the
motivation behind these positions.
The interest of the program recipient is that of living in a basically safe
facility that provides adequate health care, without the threat of an unsafe
transfer. The facility, on the other hand, is concerned with retaining its status
as a Medicare or Medicaid provider to sustain its steady income that allow for
an appropriate amount of return.20 ' Any institution will be tempted to cut
back on essential services since what is not spent becomes profit;2 02 or to incur
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g) (1976).

197. Id. §§ 1301-10.
198. E. WrrKiN, THE IMPACT OF MEDICARE 96 (1971).
199. B. MANARD, P. WoEHLE, & J. HEILMAN, BETTER HOMES FOR THE OLD 65 (1977).
200. Gibson, 1979 Expenditures,supra note 12, at 5.
201. R. STEvENs, supra note 184, at 188.
202, This is possible when medicaid reimburses the nursing home on a flat fee basis set by the
state. F. Moss & V. HALAMANDARiS, Too OLD, Too SicK, Too BAD: NURSING HOMES IN
AMERICA 141 (1977).
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higher amounts of reimbursable costs, rather than concentrating on patient
care. 203 Critics have charged that the residents' interest in the provision of
adequate health care with limited reimbursed funds, cannot be reconciled with
the provider's interest in maximizing its income. 2°4 The conflict is aggravated
when proprietary chain ownership is involved. In chain operations, investors
expect yearly growth and return; indeed, the basis for chain operations is
20 5
greater profits by reason of lower unit costs.
The opportunity for the nursing home to derive substantial economic
benefit from participation In the Medicare and Medicaid programs does not
come without responsibility. This interweaving of the provider's economic interests with its obligations to its residents is another unique feature of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs. The legislative history of Medicare and
Medicaid indicates that accompanying the federal government's agreement
not to control the provision of medical services, was the provider's responsibility for the care of the recipients of the services. 20 6 The existence of this obligation for care is implicit in the structure of nursing home participation in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs. It commits itself to comply with minimum
standards of care and operation set out in the conditions of participation and
the state licensing requirements. 20 7 The federal government, when awarding
the private nursing home the benefits of program participation, is also charging it with the responsibilities of program participation.
When faced by a provider challenge to the decertification process, the first
step of the court's analysis is framed by the question: does the nursing home
have a protected interest in its participation in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs? By its very nature this first step in the entitlement analysis restricts
the court. The court must look only to the nursing home and the program,
and their statutory, regulatory and contractual relationship. Yet, the Medicare
and Medicaid programs are unique in their three party system, dual objectives,
and special role given the nursing home. They require an analysis that considers these features at the outset. It must look not only to the rights created for
the nursing home by the words of the statute or regulations, but also the
home's responsibilities created by the statute and regulations, and the interests
of the residents.
B.

The Second Step of the Entitlement Analysis: OpportunityforLimited
Considerationof Medicare and Medicaid's Unique Features

When a court finds that a provider has a protected interest in program
participation, it must then determine the procedure adequate to protect that
interest. This inquiry is not a simple one. If the judiciary is to continue em203. This can occur when states reimburse providers prospectively based on past costs. Id. at
142.
204. Testimony of consumer advocate Ralph Nader, the AFL-CIO, and others before the Sub-

comm. on Long Term Care of the Sen. Comm. on Aging. Id.
205. Id. at 83; see note 21 and accompanying text infra.
206. S. REP., supra note 179, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1965.
207. See notes 37-59 and accompanying text supra.
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ploying the traditional entitlement analysis to questions of nursing home interests in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, then in determining adequacy of
procedure, it must struggle with all of the questions raised in the first part of
this discussion.
The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test provides some opportunity to
consider and recognize the interests of the residents and the responsibilities of
the nursing home.208 When Congress passed the Medicare and Medicaid legislation, the federal and state governments undertook the obligation of overseeing the provision of adequate quality health care to the needy elderly. The
safety and welfare of residents in publicly supported nursing homes thus became a part of the government's interest in a decertification situation. When
the alleged violations of the facility place the health, safety or lives of the
residents in jeopardy, the courts have been quick to note that the government
has a strong interest in protecting residents' lives, and that summary procedures are justified.20 9 Yet all of the residents' interests are not adequately represented. As well as being concerned with the receipt of sufficient care, the
residents are interested in avoiding transfer to another facility. 2 10 By limiting
resident interests considered to those the government can assert as its own, the
government precludes recognition of concerns which are uniquely those of the
residents.
Armed with the limited consideration that can be given to legislative intent and resident safety in the second step of the analysis, courts have tipped
the balance in favor of the government's interest in ending an emergency situation. 2 11 They have asserted that the residents are the real beneficiaries of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, that the health and safety of the residents is
much more important than the financial survival of the facility, and that the
protected interest the provider does have is merely a statutory business relationship.2 12 Ironically, what was important enough to constitute an interest
protected by the due process clause in the first step of an analysis, becomes a
mere business relationship in the second step of that analysis. This result illustrates the constraints put upon the judiciary by the first step of the traditional
entitlement analysis. In a vacuum, without consideration of other relevant
factors, the nursing home seems to have an important protected interest in its
expectation of continued participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Yet when the courts reach the second step of the analysis, and must
decide how that expectation should be protected, its significance lessens con208. See notes 142-68 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 148-49 and accompanying text supra.

210. Transfer from a facility can be avoided by the appointment of a medical receiver to
operate the facility and bring it back into compliance with applicable standards. The facility can
then be returned to the control of its original owners, or sold to another. See Butler, Assuring the
Quality of Care and Ljfe in Nursing Homes: The Dilemma of Enforcement, 57 N.C.L. RIv. 1317,

1352 (1979).
211. See notes 155-60 supra.
212. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc., v. Beal, 586 F.2d 266, 277 (3d Cir. 1978); Case v.
Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1975).
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siderably in light of the limited recognition that the judges can make of the
residents' interests and the nursing home's responsibilities.
C Modyfcation of the TraditionalEntitlementAnalysis to Meet the Unique
Features of the Medicare andMedicaidPrograms
The unique three-party structure of the Medicare and Medicaid programs
must be recognized in the traditional entitlement analysis if it is to adequately
deal with the realities of a nursing home decertification. Three sets of interests
are at stake in any nursing home decertification: the facility's, the government's, and the residents'. The physical well-being of the residents is as much
a part of that decertification as the financial well-being of the facility. Assuring consideration of the third party, the resident, in an essentially two-party
analysis can be achieved through either of two mechanisms.
The first of these mechanisms requires the nursing home .to show that it is
meeting its statutory obligation to its residents. The nursing home's obligation
to provide adequate health care services to needy program recipients is as
much a part of the statutory relationship between the provider and the government as its financial expectation of continued participation in the programs.
The legislative history of the 1965 health care reform measures indicates that
Congress intended to integrate the private health care system into its provision
of publicly-funded health care services. 2 13 Yet, the express purpose of the
Medicare and Medicaid statutes was to provide health care services to certain
categories of needy and deserving individuals. 2 14 The private health-care network was to be the government's conduit for delivery of the actual health care
services. Any judicial analysis of the relation between the government and the
nursing home must include recognition of this statutory commingling of the
benefits of incorporation into the programs' structure and the obligation to
provide health care services to program beneficiaries.
The most likely result of this recognition of the nursing home's obligations to its residents is a stronger consideration of the residents' interests at the
second stage of the entitlement analysis. 2 15 Examination of the facility's
showing regarding its compliance with its responsibilities to the residents will
allow the court to evaluate the health and conditions of the residents. The
results of that examination will then figure prominently in the factors to be
balanced by the trial judge when determining the procedures appropriate to
protect the nursing home's entitlement. If the effect of the provider's alleged
noncompliance on the residents does not present an immediate threat to the
health and safety of the residents, and the potential harmful effects of resident
213. See text accompanying notes 181-97 supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 177-80 supra.
215. The most extreme result would be a finding that the nursing home's statutory obligation
to its residents is the most important aspect of its relationship with the government. The facility's
statutory business relationship with the government would be all but obviated, resulting in a finding of no entitlement. This result is not a desirable one. Such a finding would leave the posttermination hearing intact when a hearing at that time would not meet the needs of the residents
or the facility.
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transfer and limited bed supplies are before the court, a pretermination hearing may well be required. If, on the other hand, there is a real threat to the
residents' health and safety, immediate termination of facility reimbursement
and a post-termination hearing are in order.
The second mechanism for assuring consideration of the residents' interests in a nursing home's decertification is a broadening of the scope of the
government's interest. The required showing of interest should be expanded
to encompass not only consideration of the immediacy of the danger to the
residents' health and safety caused by the alleged noncompliance, but also the
severe consequences of transfer on the residents' physical and psychological
well-being. Where the government cannot show that the threat of transfer
trauma and bed shortages will not outweigh the immediate dangers presented
by the noncompliance there is no emergency situation justifying summary
government procedures and therefore, a pretermination hearing is in order.
Although the residents may not have the right to direct involvement in
the hearing on the merits of the decertification,2 16 consideration of their interests must not be precluded. In O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, the
Supreme Court noted that both HHS and the state medicaid agency would
benefit from input by the residents regarding facility compliance, citing regulations which require patient interviews under some circumstances as part of
the periodic review of facility compliance.2 17 That requirement should be
broadened to include patient input where the initial decertification determination is being made. In addition, during the hearing on the merits the government should be bound to show that the dangers presented by transfer to
another facility and bed shortages will not outweigh those dangers currently
faced by residents because of alleged facility noncompliance.
. Any judicial modification of the traditional entitlement analysis
to better
meet the realities of Medicare and Medicaid nursing home decertifications
would be a welcome and needed change. The recognition of the nursing
home's obligations to its residents, and the broadening of the scope of the
government's interest can be a beneficial part of that modification.
JANE BEYER

216. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
217. 447 U.S. at 782 n.15.

